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This paper explores ‘reasonable doubt’ as an enlightening notion to think of reasoning 
and decision-making generally, beyond the judicial domain. The paper starts from a 
decision-theoretic understanding of the notion, whereby it can be defined in terms of 
degrees of belief and a probabilistic confirmation threshold for action. It then highlights 
some of the limits of this notion, and proposes a richer analysis of epistemic states and 
reasoning through the lens of ‘reasonable doubt’, which in turn is likely to supplement 
the DT framework. The strategy consists in fighting on two fronts: with DT, the paper 
claims that there is no absolute (i.e. decision-independent) notion of ‘reasonable doubt’ 
but, pace DT, it shows that reasonable doubt cannot be accounted for only in terms of 
degrees of belief and probabilistic threshold. We argue that the lens of reasonable doubt 
sheds light on aspects of belief dynamics, as well as of the nature of epistemic attitudes, 
which are often obscured by belief-centred approaches. In particular, when it comes to 
acknowledging the necessary ignorance and irreducible uncertainty that we face in our 
everyday-life decisions, studying the various facets of doubt rather than focusing on 
what can be believed, enables one to do justice to the richness and diversity of the 




When is doubt reasonable? Doubting is widely acknowledged as epistemically virtuous, 
and as shielding us from dogmatism and fanaticism. In that sense, one could be tempted 
to argue that doubt is always reasonable — after all, no empirical hypothesis is ever 
100% certain, hence an uncompromising truth-seeker should consider the falsity of any 
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of them as a possibility. However, in most real-life situations, waiting until complete 
certainty is achieved before taking action seems an unreasonable and impractical 
attitude. The issue of what makes doubt (un)reasonable therefore seems to arise 
primarily in the practical domain, where some decision has to be made that depends on 
one’s conclusions regarding the hypothesis at stake. Typically, should one convict or 
acquit a person accused of having committed a given crime? But also, should one 
vaccinate a child? Take steps to mitigate climate change? Or should one rather doubt 
the hypotheses grounding the arguments in favour of such actions? 
Even when no practical decision appears to be immediately at stake, following the 
sceptic’s recommendation of keeping one’s mind open to any alternative hypothesis to 
the most widely held and/or best supported by the evidence, need not always be 
reasonable. Open-mindedness and doubt are often misused as slogans by “merchants 
of doubt” (Oreskes & Conway 2010), who question the authority of institutional science 
in bad faith, as well as by the advocates of those highly unreasonable conjectures that 
fall under the fuzzy category of “conspiracy theories”. Under the guise of critical thinking 
and anti-dogmatist approaches, one finds “free minds” invited to doubt the official 
theory (according to which, for instance, the Earth is round, or the 9/11 attacks were 
plotted by Al-Qaeda) — if not to adopt a specific alternative theory (according to which 
the Earth is flat or the 9/11 attacks were plotted by the Mossad and the CIA) 1. Where 
does the boundary lie, between epistemic over-cautiousness verging on social paranoia, 
and the fair stubbornness of the juror embodied by Henry Fonda in Twelve Angry Men2, 
who refuses to convict the defendant without first questioning in every detail the 
prosecution’s story (and especially the coherence and credibility of all pieces of 
supposedly incriminating evidence), even though this story is prima facie highly 
plausible? In both cases, one rejects, at least temporarily, the official version (the most 
widely held, authorised, consensual, and probably the best supported by the available 
evidence); one highlights its flaws, and explores any conceivable alternative, even 
                                                     
1 As Stephen John emphasised in a personal communication, it is very important to keep the issues of 
rejecting a theory and of accepting another separate, since it is possible to undermine, e.g., climate 
science without providing an alternative positive theory. Many conspiracy theories thus rest on an 
illegitimate assumption that the burden of proof is on the side of the official theory. See Hahn & Oaksford 
2007 for reflection on the use of the notion of burden of proof in argumentation beyond the legal domain. 
2 Movie by Sidney Lumet (1957), from a TV play by Reginald Rose (1954). 
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though prima facie implausible, scenario. How are we to account for the ‘common-
sense’ intuition, according to which what seems delusional in one case is reasonable in 
the other? 
An obvious candidate seems to be a decision-theoretic: A natural answer to the question 
above consists in emphasizing the importance of the decisional context. In the case of 
the juror, a man’s life being at stake, it can be reasonable to keep doubting his guilt even 
in the presence of strongly incriminating evidence, while such obstinacy may become 
unreasonable in situations where the stakes are lower (or where nothing practical seems 
to be immediately at stake). Representing the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis 
in question in probabilistic terms, one can thus define ‘reasonable doubt’ in terms of a 
probabilistic confirmation threshold, set according to the context and the associated 
utilities. 
Being thus closely tied to rational action, what can reasonable doubt bring to the 
analysis of reasonable belief? The notion of belief is central to at least two domains of 
contemporary epistemology: first, the study of the dynamics of belief (or rational belief 
change), and, second, the branch of mainstream epistemology concerned with 
epistemic attitudes and their justification.3 Those two domains rarely communicate, and 
the ‘beliefs’ they posit as the primitive elements of mental life have incompatible 
definitions — despite some attempts at conciliating them.4 The two domains have in 
common, though, that they have overlooked the notion of doubt.5 One of our goals in 
this paper is to show that the lens of reasonable doubt sheds light on aspects of belief 
dynamics, as well as of the nature of epistemic attitudes, which are often obscured by 
belief-centred approaches. 
                                                     
3 See for instance Bonjour & Sosa 2003, Dancy 1985, Pollock 1986, Pritchard 2005. 
4 See footnote 46 below. 
5 One contemporary exception is Thagard (2004), but this paper remains marginal, and his definition of 
doubt is all in all quite cursory. To our knowledge, the most in-depth recent analysis of doubt is Salmon’s 
(1995), but his proposal makes sense against the background of issues in the philosophy of language and 
logic, rather than in an epistemological and psychological framework as ours. Jane Friedman’s (2017, 
forthcoming) works linking inquiry with suspension of judgement notably put an emphasis on the 
importance of those epistemic states and actions that are generally ignored by belief-centred approaches. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, while the present paper was under review, two papers on doubt have 
appeared (Lee 2018; Moon 2018). The conceptions of doubt that they defend are different from ours, but 
the issues they address are mostly orthogonal to the main focus of the present paper, which places 
discussion of their views beyond its scope. 
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Our strategy will consist in fighting on two fronts: with the decision-theoretic view (from 
now on, “DT”), we claim that there is no absolute (i.e., decision-independent) notion of 
‘reasonable doubt’ but, pace DT, we show that reasonable doubt cannot be accounted 
for only in terms of degrees of belief and probabilistic threshold. In particular, when it 
comes to acknowledging the necessary ignorance and irreducible uncertainty that we 
face in our everyday-life decisions, studying the various facets of doubt rather than 
focusing on what can be believed enables one to do justice to the richness and diversity 
of the mental states in play. As we will see, depending on the context and the 
hypotheses at stake, doubting might indeed imply substantially diverse epistemic 
attitudes and actions. 
Emphasizing such diversity, and the complexity of the components of the 
(un)reasonableness of doubt, should contribute to highlight the similarities between 
cases of applied scepticism as diverse as the juror’s and the conspiracy theorist’s ones. 
In particular, this will imply questioning the distinction between cases with practical 
stakes, from ‘purely’ theoretical ones. 
In what follows, we adopt the decision-theoretic framework. From this starting point, 
we examine several intuitions underlying the notion of reasonable doubt. Rather than 
systematically questioning its power and relevance, our strategy throughout the paper 
consists in conceding as much as possible to the DT framework. This will lead us to finally 
highlight some of its limits, and to propose a richer analysis of epistemic states and 
reasoning through the lens of ‘reasonable doubt’, which in turn is likely to supplement 
the DT framework. In the first section, we sketch the minimal, prima facie, definition of 
reasonable doubt that can be given in DT terms. In section 2, we deepen our analysis of 
the notion of doubt as it arises in this framework. Section 3 takes a detour through an 
analysis of ‘full belief’, examining to what extent it escapes the DT framework (as being 
apparently independent from any decisional context), and section 4 explores whether 
the DT framework can account for all aspects of the (un)reasonableness of doubt — 
especially when no practical decision appears immediately at stake. Although our 
conclusions at this point will not go frontally against the DT framework, those analyses 
will finally lead us to highlight some intrinsic limits of the consequence-dependent 
probabilistic threshold view of reasonable doubt in section 5. 
 5 
 
1. The decision-theoretic (DT) image of reasonable doubt 
 
In everyday life, as well as in the scientific, legal, medical, or policy-making contexts, the 
informational basis for making decisions is often complex, heterogeneous, incomplete, 
and partially contradictory. In most situations, practical necessity compels us to take 
action upon partially confirmed hypotheses: although complete certainty hasn’t been 
reached regarding the relevant hypothesis H (and is most of the time a long way off), 
one must act based thereupon. Let us call such action based upon H, acceptance of H.  
1.1 Acceptance as context-dependent 
Before spending a day out without knowing whether it will rain or not, one should for 
instance decide whether to accept that it will rain (act upon this hypothesis by carrying 
one’s umbrella) or not (leave one’s umbrella home). As is obvious from this example, 
the degree to which a hypothesis is supported by the evidence isn’t enough to 
determine whether one should accept it: both the available evidence (provided by the 
weather forecast and other relevant sources), and the decisional context including the 
utilities associated to the expected consequences of the various possible actions, have 
to be taken into account (factoring in, e.g., the relative waterproofness of one’s coat, 
and the weight and cumbersomeness of one’s umbrella). Similarly, a doctor deciding 
whether to prescribe a medication with potentially severe side-effects (assuming such 
medication being the only chance to cure a serious disease that her patient shows some 
symptoms of), or a policy-maker deciding whether to implement a costly policy aimed 
at shortly reducing greenhouse gases emission, should in principle make a cost-benefit 
analysis based on the available information, and decide on which hypothesis to act (that 
the patient actually suffers from that disease, that the experts’ forecast, according to 
which the current emission level of greenhouse gases would have irreversible effects if 
it does not fall in the short term, is accurate). One can thus assume that there is a 
confirmation threshold, above which one should accept a given hypothesis — i.e., take 
action based on it. Below such threshold, one should not accept hypothesis H. 
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Depending on the situation, this may imply rejecting H (and accepting non-H6), or rather 
seeking more information before accepting or rejecting H. 
Note that the threshold for acceptance is context-dependent, meaning that the same 
hypothesis might be acceptable vis-à-vis one decision, while it should be rejected vis-à-
vis another one. Consider the hypothesis H according to which it will rain this afternoon. 
If the decision at stake concerns whether or not to carry one’s umbrella, assuming that 
the umbrella is light and one’s coat not waterproof, it may seem reasonable, even with 
a low p(H), to accept H — to carry one’s umbrella, acting as if it was going to rain. But if 
the decision concerns whether to take one’s plants out on the rooftop or not (assuming 
this is a heavy task and one will have to bring them back in at night), then one might not 
accept H, and wait until a day when the likelihood of rain be higher. The confirmation 
degree of H is the same in the two situations, but the threshold for acceptance moves.7 
What does ‘reasonable doubt’ mean, in such a framework? One straightforward answer 
would be to define it just as the complementary to rational action: there is reasonable 
doubt as to H when the acceptance threshold for H hasn’t been met. Prima facie, this is 
all the DT framework has to say about ‘reasonable doubt’. Let us now consider the task 
of jurors in criminal trials from this perspective. 
1.2 The juror’s task 
The notion of ‘Reasonable Doubt’ is famous for being the core concept of the highest 
standard of proof in Common Law systems: jurors in criminal trials are instructed to 
convict if and only if the defendant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
(BARD). Although no clear and consensual definition of the BARD standard emerges 
from legal theory or practice8, one plausible option is to conceive of it as a probabilistic 
                                                     
6 Section 5 will develop on the variety of what accepting non-H might imply. 
7 As one anonymous referee suggested, one may also want to include some notion of partial acceptance 
(as distinct from acceptance of H-in-full); for example, if one’s evidence is not great, one may take the 
lighter of two umbrellas. However, we suspect that this could be accounted for in terms of full acceptance 
by clearly specifying the decisional context: there may be one decision that concerns the heavier (and 
safer) umbrella, regarding which one does not accept H (because, given the respective costs of false 
negatives and false positives, one does not evaluate H as likely enough to carry the umbrella — just as for 
the decision whether to take one’s plants out or not), and another one involving the lighter umbrella, 
regarding which one actually (fully) accepts H (concluding H is likely enough for one to decide to carry the 
lighter umbrella). 
8 See e.g. Laudan 2008, 32-37, Roberts & Zuckermann 2010, 253-258. 
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threshold, by describing it as a function of the utilities associated with the various 
possible outcomes of the jury’s decision, namely condemning / freeing an innocent / a 
guilty person.9 To be sure, establishing such a threshold is a far from trivial task: although 
Blackstone’s (1765) formula according to which “it is better that ten guilty persons 
escape than that one innocent suffer” can be appealed to as an inspiration of such a 
consequentialist interpretation of the BARD standard, taking it (or any other similar 
consideration) literally would feel highly arbitrary. Besides, it is a debatable issue 
whether the BARD threshold should be thought of as fixed, or as a ‘sliding scale’10, 
depending on the case (the seriousness of the crime, and relatedly the severity of the 
sentence).11 Those are reasons to doubt whether it is possible to set a quantitative 
threshold (based on utilities) corresponding to BARD, and some have actually argued 
that we should drop such a view of the judicial standard of proof altogether, and rather 
interpret it as expressing some (high) level of subjective certainty.12 As such, these are 
not objections to a DT view of ‘reasonable doubt’ outside the judicial domain: 
‘reasonable doubt’ might ironically be trickier to define as a legal standard of proof than 
in other cases (although the very phrase ‘reasonable doubt’ stems from the legal 
context). 
In this section, we nevertheless use the figure of the juror to explore some aspects of 
the DT account of reasonable doubt. We do not pretend to describe what actually 
happens in real courtrooms, no more than to explicate the BARD standard as jurors 
                                                     
9 Such a conception can be traced back at least to Justice Harlan’s words in In re Winship (1970), 397 US 
358, 363. See also Kaplan 1965, 1968, Allen 1977, Lillquist 2002, Laudan & Saunders 2009. 
10 See Roberts & Zuckerman 2010, 253. See Picinali 2013 for a criticism of the DT approach to reasonable 
doubt based on the issue of the variability of the corresponding threshold. 
11 Another, related problem is that there seems to be something inconsistent in saying that the BARD 
standard is the highest standard of proof, used in criminal cases because stakes are particularly high in 
those cases, and to defining reasonable doubt as a threshold depending on the utilities. If one defines 
‘reasonable doubt’ in BARD as set on the utilities, then BARD should apply to any case — ‘balance of 
probabilities’ corresponding to what counts as ‘reasonable doubt’ in the contexts of civil law. This might 
offer grounds for a criticism to DT accounts of the BARD standard of proof, and one might have to admit 
of two uses of ‘reasonable doubt’, one in terms of utilities, and one more specific as used in the BARD 
legal standard (thanks to Stephen John for helping us clarifying this). 
12 As a matter of fact, since the turn of the 21st century, the Crown Court has given up the very phrase 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” in its guidance to trial judges in directing the jury, in favour of a mention 
that “the prosecution must make the jury sure that [the defendant] is guilty” to prove guilt, and that 
“nothing less will do”. (Judicial College, The Crown Court Compendium –  Part I: Jury and Trial Management 
and Summing Up (February 2017), 5-8 (on line at www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/crown-court-bench-
book-directing-the-jury-2/). Note that such a restatement of the criminal standard of proof makes it 
considerably closer to the French rule of ‘innermost conviction’ (intime conviction). 
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should understand and implement it — or as it is intended by the law. Rather, we take 
(an abstract and idealised version of) the juror’s task as offering a simplified image of 
consequential decision-making under uncertainty: the hypothesis that is in fine13 at 
stake (guilt) is true or false absolutely (unlike, e.g., the hypothesis of the potential 
hazards of greenhouse gases14), evidence is strictly circumscribed, and only two 
decisions, irreversible and serious, are possible (acquit or convict)15. Further, an 
interesting feature of a trial verdict is that it is at the same time an assertion (supposed 
to express a proposition), and a consequential action (convicting someone both consists 
in declaring him guilty, and in sentencing him).16 
Although the objections to the possibility of setting a threshold for BARD mentioned 
above are well-grounded, we want to highlight further issues with the threshold view of 
reasonable doubt, which arise even if we concede that some threshold can initially be 
set. This is relevant because in many everyday life situations, it does make sense to 
assume that there exists, at least in principle, such a threshold. Let us thus assume that 
a reasonable doubt threshold has been set for the juror’s decision task. This task can be 
schematically reconstructed as follows. Presented with a set of evidence of various 
types, the juror is supposed to evaluate the strength of this evidence, and accordingly 
update her estimate of the probability of guilt/innocence. Finally, she is supposed to 
assess the strength of such posterior probability against the supposedly fixed threshold, 
so as to bring a verdict. If guilt is confirmed beyond this threshold — if there is no 
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty —, she must bring a guilty 
verdict. Otherwise — if there is a reasonable doubt —, she has no choice but to bring a 
                                                     
13 There are of course several hypotheses to examine on which the final hypothesis rests. See Schum 1994 
for a thorough analysis of the “cascaded inference” at play in (legal) evidential reasoning. 
14 Indeed, the question is not only whether it is true that greenhouse gases can be harmful, but how much. 
On the contrary, the accused is guilty or not of the charge — that being independent from the epistemic 
fact that the hypothesis of guilt is doomed, as any other empirical hypothesis, to be never 100% 
confirmed. 
15 But see below footnote 45. 
16 As suggested by one anonymous referee, this ‘verdictive’ aspect of verdicts might be a reason not to 
take the figure of the juror as paradigmatic. As our referee emphasizes, this contrasts with most other 
cases: for instance, accepting that climate change is anthropogenic might play a role in various practical 
decisions, but there is a gap between the acceptance and the subsequent action (of, say, imposing a limit 
on greenhouse gases emissions), which is often taken by another agent (here, governments). However, 
given our views on acceptance, and of assertion as a kind of acceptance (see 3.2), this makes the juror’s 
case even more interesting, by highlighting the essential link between acceptance, assertion, and action. 
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not guilty verdict. 
1.3 The two cornerstones of the DT image 
In the foregoing, we have assumed that the degree of confirmation for a hypothesis can 
be represented by means of a probability value. In the most standard DT framework, 
such probabilities are construed as agents’ degrees of belief (hence as subjective, 
Bayesian probabilities). In the following, we will adopt the Bayesian framework: we will 
consider that the posterior probability of the hypothesis is the degree to which the agent 
believes this hypothesis after examining all available evidence.17 The DT image of 
reasonable doubt so sketched relies on two cornerstones: 
[C1] For a given hypothesis H in a given decisional context, there exists a probabilistic 
confirmation threshold calculated according to the utilities, beyond which one should 
act upon H (viz. act as if H were true, as far as the decision at stake is concerned). 
[C2] The only epistemic attitudes assumed by the DT account are graded beliefs 
(subjective probabilities). ‘Acceptance’ is not a distinct epistemic attitude: accepting H 
is acting based upon H, no more no less. In some situations, one may act upon a given 
hypothesis (accept it) even if one believes it to a low degree; in others, one may also 
decide not to act upon a strongly confirmed hypothesis. 
Similarly, the DT framework does not say anything about doubt as a distinct mental 
state: ‘reasonable doubt’ appears as the complement to rational action (acceptance), 
and the DT framework does not say anything about the mental states one may entertain 
in the space of doubt. This does not amount to saying that accepting or doubting H do 
not come along with certain mental states, but the DT image does not imply this. The 
DT framework only posits graded beliefs and decisions based thereupon, the 
reasonableness of such decisions (be they acceptance or doubt) being assessed by 
reference to a consequence-dependent threshold. 
Although the DT framework prima facie appears as an obvious candidate to account for 
important intuitions underlying the notion of ‘reasonable doubt’, this very notion does 
not seem to add in much to the DT analysis of rational action. In other words, the DT 
                                                     
17 In section 3, we clarify some assumptions and implications of such a view. 
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account of reasonable doubt is rather deflationary, ‘reasonable doubt’ being essentially 
defined in terms of graded beliefs and a probabilistic threshold for action. Is that all 
there is to reasonable doubt? 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to further exploring intuitions that underlie 
the notion of reasonable doubt as it can be appealed to in several situations, which will 
lead us to highlight some limits of the DT framework. Two main routes will be followed, 
which correspond to the two cornerstones abovementioned. After further analysis of 
the notion of doubt in section 2, sections 3 and 4 will question whether [C2] is tenable, 
by exploring whether all (seemingly) mental states at play in the space of doubt (beside 
graded beliefs) can really be described in terms of decisions whose reasonableness 
depends on utilities. Although the conclusion of this first journey will mostly be 
compatible with DT, section 5 will draw on this analysis to highlight some intrinsic limits 
of [C1]. 
 
2. More on doubt 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that the DT framework, which seems prima facie 
well suited to capture essentials aspects of ‘reasonable doubt’, is deflationary. Doubt is 
reasonable whenever the threshold for action hasn’t been reached; when it has been 
reached, doubt becomes unreasonable. However, in some situations, what we mean by 
‘reasonable doubt’ seems not to be entirely captured by talking of the complementary 
to rational action. In fact, in situations such as the ones imagined in the trivial rain-and-
umbrella example, asking whether it is reasonable to doubt would seem superfluously 
pompous: one would rather simply wonder whether to take one’s umbrella or not. In 
such cases, it is obvious that speaking of ‘reasonable doubt’ instead of rational action 
(based on reasonable belief) would add nothing to a DT account. But there are situations 
where the question of reasonable doubt seems to make much better sense. In such 
situations, is it always possible to reformulate the question of whether doubting a given 
hypothesis is reasonable in terms of whether one should act upon (accept) it? 
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In order to answer this question, we will start by deepening our analysis of the very 
notion of ‘doubt’. Our goal, in this section, is not to specifically challenge the DT account, 
but rather to unravel aspects of the notion of doubt that underlies our study of 
‘reasonable doubt’ as an enlightening category. As will be apparent, most of its aspects 
are compatible with the DT account. However, the clarification proposed in this section 
is a necessary preliminary to the remainder of the argument. 
 
2.1. Doubt as decision-relative and dynamical 
First of all, as finely accounted for in the DT framework, doubt is essentially relative to a 
certain decision. It seems to make little sense to ask whether one doubts a given 
hypothesis tout court (in absolute terms), independent from any particular decision to 
be made. Doubt does not merely correspond to lack of certainty.18 Nor does it 
systematically correspond to a low-degree belief. First, in some circumstances, a low 
confirmation degree can suffice to stop doubting. Second, we are far from certain of 
most imaginable hypotheses, but one would not say that one doubts them, simply 
because one does not care about them: if no decision is at stake, the question of doubt 
makes little sense.19 Be they likely or not, most hypotheses play no role in our reasoning 
and decisions: upon thinking of them, one may say that one believes some of them, 
disbelieves others, without the notion of doubt being relevant to account for those 
mental states. Is there somebody in the next room, from where you just happened to 
hear a sneeze? You hadn’t wondered before, but yes, you believe so. However, if some 
important decision depended thereupon, you would probably start doubting it (e.g. 
imagining alternative scenarios leading to your having the illusion of hearing a sneeze 
from that room) and search for more grounds before accepting it. Conversely, if a 
difficult issue dissolves without one having to make one’s mind regarding a hitherto 
                                                     
18 We do not claim that no occurrence of the notion of doubt in ordinary language corresponds to lack of 
certainty, but rather that the cases where it makes sense to ask whether doubt is reasonable are not of 
this kind. Our proposal is not intended as accounting for all the meanings that the word ‘doubt’ may have 
in different contexts; see Moon 2018 for such a proposal. 
19 Such a stake-related aspect of doubt has been acknowledged by Thagard (2004), after Peirce (1877). 
However, it is not necessary, as Thagard does, to appeal to incoherence (according to him, doubt arises 
from the hypothesis’ conflicting with one’s background beliefs). Moreover, Thagard uses this idea to reject 
the probabilistic account of reasonable doubt; we however argue that they are compatible. 
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critical question, doubt may cease by itself, without making room for acceptance of any 
specific hypothesis regarding that question. In that sense, to stop doubting H does not 
always imply accepting H: one may stop doubting a hypothesis just because this does 
not matter anymore, without one’s having to accept or reject it. 
Consider a juror. If, at the end of the deliberation, she concludes that guilt has not been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt, she must bring a ‘not guilty’ verdict. Once this 
decision has been made, the question of doubt no longer arises: the issue is settled20. 
Admittedly, the juror may still experience some doubt about the case, once out of the 
court. But such doubt is not related to the verdict and its stakes anymore. Moreover, 
assuming the defendant has been acquitted, the doubt she may feel should rather 
concern his innocence than his guilt: it would not make sense anymore for her to say “I 
doubt he is guilty”. The situation has changed, so did the object of doubt, its stake, and 
the threshold for its reasonableness.21 
As this example shows, the question of doubt specifically makes sense when the 
hypothesis at stake is per default accepted — be it the official one, the most widely held, 
or even the best supported and confirmed one.22 In other words, doubt is essentially 
dynamical, implying a somewhat effortful movement against the otherwise accepted 
hypothesis.23 Imagine a scientist proposing a fanciful alternative to a theory in favour of 
                                                     
20 This is the reason why it is not relevant, in the framework of the present analysis, to include in the 
definition of doubt acceptance of the complement to the hypothesis at stake (as does Salmon 1995 at the 
onset his paper): when one accepts non-H, it makes no big sense to say that one doubts H. 
21 Certainly, as one anonymous referee emphasized, we can, and often do, have “idle doubts”, namely 
doubts regarding a past decision, even though that decision is irreversible. That is however compatible 
with our view of doubt as decision-relative and dynamical: after the defendant was acquitted, the juror 
may doubt whether she has made the right choice. That hypothesis (let us call it H’) is different from both 
the guilt (H), and the innocence (-H) hypothesis (which she may also doubt). The fact that she cannot 
come back on the decision on which it bears (which itself depended on H) does not imply that accepting 
or doubting H’ has no relevance whatsoever for the ex-juror. Indeed, as the anonymous referee 
insightfully suggests, such alertness to the choices one should have made in the past may be a useful skill 
to cultivate if one wants to make better decisions in the future. One may account for the need to clarify 
whether one has made the right choice as an epistemic decision to be made, which might have practical 
consequences in the future. 
22 True, presumption of innocence may suggest that the per default hypothesis should be innocence. But 
as soon as there is trial, it is clearly acknowledged that one should doubt innocence, and what becomes 
at stake is whether there is any doubt about guilt. This is one among other difficulties with how to account 
for presumption of innocence in a Bayesian framework (see Dahlman 2017, Fenton et al. 2017). 
23 In particular, raising the issue of whether it is reasonable to doubt makes particularly good sense when 
doubting would consist in actively questioning a hypothesis that the subject herself would be naturally 
inclined to accept. 
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which there is large consensus among scientists. It makes sense to ask whether it is 
reasonable to doubt the consensual theory and consider the alternative one, but it 
makes no real sense to ask whether one should doubt the alternative one (even though 
one may consider it with much scepticism). 
 
2.2 A variety of possible routes in the space of doubt 
Rather than a unique and stable epistemic attitude towards a given hypothesis, doubt 
thus appears to be the response to a question raised in a given decisional context. Such 
a response may imply a variety of distinct attitudes and actions. As we have seen, the 
juror on duty has no other choice, at the end of the deliberation, to either accept H or 
reject it. But, before the verdict, in the space of doubt, several routes might be followed, 
as remarkably illustrated by Twelve Angry Men. One may explore the prosecution’s story 
so as to test its internal coherence and the plausibility of its various implications. One 
may also question the reliability of the sources of the evidence backing that story. 
Alternatively, one may try to build up exculpatory scenarios, etc. This is far from specific 
to the trial context. Quite similarly indeed, a scientist who doubts a hypothesis that is 
consensual, or even unanimously endorsed in the scientific community, has a great 
variety of possible search strategies. Among other options, she may explore this 
hypothesis, with the hope of showing its flaws by drawing obviously unacceptable 
conclusions from it, or else formulate an alternative, incompatible hypothesis, and 
explore its consequences so as to show its fruitfulness. Depending on the time and 
cognitive resources she is able to invest, she may also do both in parallel. 
Although the DT framework does not say much about the variety of possible reasoning 
routes and actions in the space of doubt, the conception of doubt we have just sketched 
is so far compatible with the DT framework.24 In the next two sections, we will however 
explore two ways we might actually be tipped out of such framework. 
Consider the juror out of the court again. First, as we have said, even though she has 
brought a ‘not guilty’ verdict and the defendant has been acquitted, she may still be 
                                                     
24 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, the general picture of inquiry sketched here could be nicely 
complemented analyses of the relationships between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesian 
accounts. 
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experiencing some doubt regarding his innocence. What would such doubt imply, and 
to what decision would it be related? What makes it (un)reasonable, if anything? We 
will address those questions in section 4, exploring whether there could in some 
situations be reasons (not) to doubt that do not relate to any decisional context, and do 
not reduce to a cost-benefit calculation, and shedding light on the reasonableness of the 
various possible routes in the space of doubt. 
Before then, let us consider this second possibility: rather than doubting his innocence, 
our juror might actually believe that the defendant is guilty (even though she didn’t 
accept this in the trial context). In the next section, we will temporarily leave the notion 
of doubt aside, and try to clarify what that would mean, and whether it is possible to 
account for such a situation in DT terms. 
 
3. ‘Accepting’ non-H while ‘believing’ H — a detour 
 
Consider our juror: once out of the court, where she brought a verdict of acquittal, she 
confesses to a friend — or even to herself — that she actually believes that the 
defendant had committed the crime he was accused of. She does not merely say that 
she holds a certain degree of belief in the hypothesis of guilt (and a complementary 
degree of belief in the hypothesis of innocence), but rather that she somehow has the 
belief that he is guilty, and does not have the belief that he is innocent. She may certainly 
be more or less confident, as well as more or less prone to change her mind (her belief 
does not necessarily amount to certainty), but whatever its strength or entrenchment, 
her belief does not seem to correspond to the same kind of mental state than graded 
beliefs: even though it can be qualified, the expression of such belief takes the form of 
a ‘yes-no’ answer to a categorical question, rather than a graded answer to a ‘how much’ 
question. In other words, one either believes H or not.25 
                                                     
25 Not believing H may imply having no idea, but that doesn’t correspond to a degree of belief either. 
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How can such notion of belief — and the epistemic situation of the juror who accepts 
non-H while believing H — be accounted for in the DT framework?26 One answer would 
be to consider such beliefs as non-(entirely)-rational, passive psychological states, which 
do not fall within the intended scope of DT.27 Another one would consist in 
acknowledging that such beliefs could be rational and evidence-based, thus requiring 
some amendment to the DT framework (at least as we presented it in section 1), by 
positing other mental states beside graded beliefs. After briefly considering the first 
option, we will explore the second, which will lead us to finally propose that ‘full’ beliefs 
may be identified with some specific kind of acceptance — thus suggesting that they 
might also be context-sensitive. 
 
3.1 Belief and acceptance as two different regimes? 
 
A first way to describe our juror’s situation is to treat belief as a passive psychological 
state, whose formation would be beyond rational control, even though it might partially 
be influenced by evidence. Acceptance, on the other hand, would result from one’s 
attempt to reason following some rational procedures — which are sometimes provided 
as more or less explicit rules (e.g., legal rules of evidence, standards of scientific methods 
and proof, etc.).28 Such a distinction would roughly correspond to Cohen’s (1995) own 
distinction between belief as a passive and non-rational mental state on the one hand, 
and acceptance as an active, voluntary, and reasoned endorsement of a claim. And in 
fact, Cohen’s (2002) claim that jurors are asked what they accept, rather than what they 
believe, is based on this distinction. This view would also match Lackey’s (2007) 
example29 of a ‘racist juror’ who cannot shake his belief that a black man accused of 
having raped a white woman has actually committed the crime, while acknowledging 
                                                     
26 Note that our view of acceptance is compatible both with cases of belief without acceptance, and with 
cases of acceptance without belief. In fact, as an anonymous referee emphasized, the notion of 
“acceptance” in the philosophy of science literature is most typically used as a way of understanding 
cognitive attitudes which, in some sense, fall short of “full belief” (see Jeffrey 1956, Levi 1960). 
27 They would not be related in any way to rational action. 
28 Thanks to Stephen John for helping us clarify this. 
29 The goal of Lackey in that paper is to show that norms of assertion are different from norms of belief 
(that it is neither necessary, nor sufficient to believe x in order to be entitled to assert x). 
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that the evidence does not support such a claim. Being aware that his non-discardable 
belief is prejudice-based, the juror tells others that the defendant is innocent (and 
probably, a fortiori, brings a verdict of acquittal, though Lackey does not make this 
explicit). 
There are several problems with such a view, among others the difficulty of 
understanding the relation between such a resilient, non-rational state, and the 
epistemic states underlying acceptance (it is indeed hard to account for acceptance so 
construed as a first order mental state). In any case, admitting such a view implies a 
renouncement of the Bayesian DT framework altogether. Discussing these issues would 
require a long development, which would be beyond the scope of this paper. We will 
rather try to account for this by sticking to the DT framework.30 Moreover, even if such 
passive and irrational psychological states not accountable in the DT framework existed, 
what we aim at capturing here is different. What we want to account for is the situation 
where a juror rejects H (hence accepts non-H31) while rationally believing H. Because the 
standard for finding someone guilty has to be particularly high, such a situation does not 
seem unrealistic. As should be clear from the preceding analysis, accepting non-H is 
nothing more than making a certain decision (taking a certain action) — in this case, 
bringing a verdict of acquittal.32 This does not imply any other particular mental state 
                                                     
30 Supposing that the case imagined by Lackey correspond to a real situation, a Bayesian account would 
consist in considering the juror’s belief (which he refuses to base his verdict on) as actually updated in 
front of the evidence presented in court, but starting from a pathologically high prior — or that his 
evidence evaluation is biased by racist prejudices and that he gives more weight to incriminating evidence. 
Being aware of that, the juror would correct this bias by the establishment of a higher threshold for 
reasonable doubt. In fact, the DT framework is able to account for prejudice-based priors and wrong 
evaluation of evidence. From that perspective, having explicit rules of evidence, and basing verdicts on 
collective decision, as well as the practice of peer-reviewing and standards of scientific proof, would in 
fact be a way to compensate for the irreducible subjectivity of belief. 
31 Indeed, at the end of the day, jurors only have two options. There is certainly time for deliberation, but, 
when the verdict is brought, rejecting H implies accepting non-H. 
32 However, acceptance as we think of it has to be based on evidence. Cohen, who emphasises the 
difference between belief and acceptance, is surprisingly unclear about that: in order to emphasise the 
voluntary character of acceptance as an action, as opposed to the passivity of belief, he claims that a juror 
bringing a verdict of acquittal because he sees the penalty as “being too severe”, or the alleged crime as 
“an honourable deed or a public service” (Cohen, 2002, 298-299), “would then be accepting, on ethical or 
pragmatic grounds rather than on cognitive ones, that the accused is not guilty, while believing perhaps 
quite firmly in his or her guilt. So the verdict would declare what the jury accepts; not what it believes.” 
However, if the juror does so independent from any consideration of the evidence, then he does not 
accept the hypothesis of innocence in our sense — the question of guilt and its probability is simply not 
relevant to his verdict. In divorcing acceptance from belief, Cohen misses the evidential grounding of the 
latter. 
 17 
towards the defendant’s innocence than a certain p(H), which may or may not give rise 
to acceptance, depending on the decision at stake.33 Although this might feel 
uncomfortable, it does not sound irrational or contradictory to estimate that the 
standard for conviction hasn’t been reached (hence bring a verdict of acquittal), while 
nevertheless silently believing that the defendant has actually committed the crime he 
is accused of — and believing it with some reasons. 
 
3.2 Categorical belief and sincere assertion — the context-dependence of belief 
 
The picture of mental states proposed by Maher (1993) seems likely to account for the 
situation described above.34 According to him, full belief (which he calls “acceptance”) 
is different from both graded beliefs and rational action. Unlike the latter, it is not a 
response given in a certain decisional context; full belief is a mental state, independent 
from any specific decision. However, it can be rational and evidence-based. Maher 
defines such full belief (‘acceptance’ in his terms) as the object of “sincere and 
intentional assertion”. Although he does not explicitly include assertions that are 
                                                     
33 The verdict’s taking a linguistic form (typically the form of an assertion about guilt) may be misleading, 
but the question asked to jurors is whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt — not 
whether they ‘believe’ that the defendant is guilty (as Cohen rightly acknowledges, although we disagree 
with his definitions of belief and acceptance). Interestingly, as a way to prevent from confusing rejection 
of guilt and belief in innocence, juries in Scotland have a choice between three verdicts: ‘guilty’, ‘not 
guilty’, and ‘not proven’, the last two equally imply acquittal. Although this can be thought of as a 
protection of the defendant, this was heavily criticized (Walter Scott called it the bastard verdict), as 
stigmatizing defendants for which the verdict was ‘not proven’, since they are not freed from any 
suspicion. 
34 There exist several attempts at conciliating a graded view of beliefs (especially in the Bayesian 
perspective), as being the most likely account of rational belief change, with the notion of full belief, as 
both highly intuitive and corresponding to the folk psychology view of mental states and the 
representationalist view of mental life, as well as largely assumed by most mainstream epistemology. 
Those attempts have given rise to a debate in epistemology and the philosophy of mind about the relation 
between full beliefs (also called ‘categorical’ or ‘outright’ beliefs) on the one hand, and graded beliefs, on 
the other (see Ebert & Smith, eds. 2012, as well as the online bibliography available at 
https://natureofrepresentation.wordpress.com/2013/09/27/bibliography-on-belief-and-degrees-of-
belief/. For a more formal approach of the question by a Bayesian who nevertheless keeps room for full 
belief, see Leitgeb 2013. This debate is sometimes practically undistinguishable from the discussion on 
the relations between belief (categorical or probabilistic) and acceptance (see Engel, ed. 2000) — those 
notions being diversely construed by different authors — and on the norms of assertion (for a recent 
contribution, see Hawthorne, Rothschild & Spectre 2016). We will not present those debates, and the 
various arguments pro and contra the reduction of full beliefs to graded beliefs (or vice-versa). We 
nevertheless take for granted that full belief cannot be equated in any simple and general way to a specific 
degree of belief, whether very high, or simply above 0.5. 
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constrained by explicit rules such as verdicts, and he may not agree to count scientific 
claims as being also constrained by such rules, hence as being essentially different from 
“sincere” assertions35, his view seems likely to match ours: most assertions would count 
as acceptances whose reasonableness is consequence-dependent, but there would 
remain a subset of assertions that would be perfectly sincere, and not context-sensitive 
— hence essentially different from acceptance of any sort. Let us now question such a 
view. 
What is sincere and intentional assertion? Imagine a friend of yours asks you whether 
the chocolate cake you’ve just baked contains peanuts. You know you haven’t put any 
peanuts in it. You would happily answer that it is peanut-free. This is a perfectly sincere 
and intentional assertion, which expresses your belief that the cake is peanut-free. 
However, if you know your friend has peanut allergy, you may answer you’re not sure 
about it — after all, you haven’t really paid attention to the exact composition of the 
chocolate you’ve been using.36 This is not a less sincere and intentional assertion than 
the previous one. Even such a non-procedural verbal exchange seems to obey some 
consequence-dependent standards. As a consequence, from a highly constrained 
context such as the trial one, to the most familiar verbal exchange, there seems to be a 
continuum, where confirmation thresholds for assertion vary depending on the 
epistemic relation between interlocutors (doctor-patient, expert-judge, expert-policy-
maker, epistemic pairs, etc.), and on what is at stake.37 From this point of view, assertion 
is, just as other actions, context-dependent. 
Is there something more to “sincere and intentional assertion” than such context-
dependent speech acts? Defining ‘sincere and intentional assertion’ as the response to 
a decontextualized question, with no further consequence than belief expression, would 
be obviously circular. Let us try, however, to imagine an opinion poll questionnaire that 
would be taken in a perfectly neutral context — if that is possible at all. Even if we 
                                                     
35 On sincerity, and how it is not the right value for understanding scientific claims and many speech acts, 
see (John 2018). Although our view is compatible with this claim, it makes finally hard to grasp what a 
‘sincere’ speech act would amount to, as we will shortly see. 
36 Maybe you would answer “I believe it is peanut-free”. But this use of ‘believe’ is not so much a 
description of your mental state, as a way to qualify the strength of your assertion. See Simons (2007) and 
Macready (2014) for a pragmatic analysis. 
37 Moreover, it would be a naïve idealization not to acknowledge that one’s attribution of mental states 
to others impacts one’s conveying one’s own mental states (even sincere). 
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assume that subjects make a sincere introspective effort, nothing allows us to assume 
that they have an easy and transparent access to their mental states38, even more so if 
they have to express them linguistically. The way questions are posed, and the very 
format of the expected answer, are probably far from neutral. 
Back to the chocolate cake and allergy example: isn’t it possible to say that you believe 
your cake is peanut free, but that you would rather not assert it? In that sense, there 
would be something like context-independent beliefs; sincere assertions expressing 
them would rather be an idealization, or at least would generally come together with 
explicit qualification according to the context (“I don’t believe there is any peanut, but I 
cannot guarantee it”). 
Maybe there are such (context-unaltered, but most often silent, and possibly 
inaccessible) beliefs: as a widely shared picture of mental states suggests, there would, 
for each individual, be something like elementary “bricks” entering into her “belief box”. 
But how we access them is a far from trivial issue. Finally, we do not see how one could 
distinguish them from certain responses, given in certain contexts. Full belief, 
considered independently of any action eliciting it, is a hard to grasp entity, much harder 
to grasp than the usual notion of belief, and with it the epistemological analyses that 
take it as the fundamental material of our mental life, suggest. The closest thing we have 
access to, has a context-dependent threshold, and therefore corresponds to a sort of 
acceptance, based on a specifically graded belief.39 In that sense, the juror’s belief in the 
defendant’s guilt, since it is expressed (even though in a private sense, as the conclusion 
of an introspective process), corresponds to an act of acceptance, with a different 
threshold from the verdict’s one.40 
                                                     
38 In fact, many philosophers and psychologists claim that we do not access to our beliefs through 
introspection. See Mandelbaum 2014, p. 75-76 for references. 
39 The views defended here are close to so-called ‘pragmatic encroachment’ positions in epistemology, 
which argue that knowledge is ‘interest-relative’, and that knowledge ascriptions should be context-
sensitive (see Weatherson 2005, Ross & Schroeder 2012, Wedgwood 2012). 
40 It is a hard question what actually determines the threshold for full beliefs so construed, and we can 
only draw conjectures about empirical issues. One can for instance suppose that the juror’s “full belief” is 
not independent from the fact that she otherwise has a verdict to bring. Maybe her threshold for belief 
would be high, so as to avoid cognitive dissonance; conversely, she might react to the uncomfortable 
feeling of bringing a verdict of acquittal while being far from convinced of innocence by acknowledging 
(at least for herself) that she believes the defendant is guilty… In all those (putative) cases, the threshold 
for reasonable doubt as far as the verdict is concerned would not be free from consequences on the 
threshold for what the juror identifies as her “belief”. More generally, it seems hard to ask oneself what 
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Although we don’t pretend to have demonstrated that there is nothing like full belief, 
which would not reduce to any kind of contextually defined degree of belief — that 
would be beyond the scope of this paper —, we haven’t found a compelling reason to 
amend the DT framework to accommodate a categorical (as opposed to graded) mental 
state that would not be context-dependent. In what follows, we will therefore consider 
that so-called ‘full beliefs’ are nothing but a kind of acceptance. This detour therefore 
serves the purpose of clarifying how much we are ready to buy from the DT framework 
— namely the essential context-dependence of anything that may appear as a stable, 
‘full’ (in the sense of non-graded) mental state — so as to make the limits of our final 
criticism precise. It will also offer a basis for the argument in the next section. 
 
4. Back to doubt: aspects of its (un)reasonableness 
 
Let us now come back to the first problem raised at the end of section 2: wouldn’t it 
sound sensible to say that, once out of the court, the juror does not have any further 
decision to make for which the defendant’s guilt may be relevant, and that the doubt 
she may experience is not relative to any specific decisional stake? If that was the case, 
it would be difficult to account for the reasonableness of doubt in terms of utilities. 
First of all, it is worth noting that there are decisions for which whether the defendant 
has committed the crime matters, even out of the court’s context. Our juror might for 
instance doubt guilt with regard to the trial context (estimating that the threshold for 
                                                     
one believes, without considering any of the decisions that are likely to result from the answer, or without 
imagining a possible interlocutor. Not only is it difficult to imagine an entirely non-contextual assertion, 
but also can we hypothesise that, for what might be the closest to such an ideally sincere assertion, the 
threshold for belief might vary along various parameters. Among other things, what (one believes) others 
believe about a given issue might make one’s own answer vary. The threshold might also vary according 
to the threshold for a decision that is typically associated to a question (which may vary between 
subjects). For instance, is it really possible to consider the question of what one believes regarding the 
potential harmfulness of vaccines without the debate on obligation to vaccinate, and the various opinions 
expressed around this entering into one’s assessment of one’s own belief? Is it possible to entirely 
dissociate the issue of the guilt of a defendant from the typically associated decision that is verdict — 
even though one does not have to actually bring a verdict? Those are psychological issues, whose answer 
can only be empirical, but raising them here enables us to highlight that full belief, as distinct from 
acceptance, is a very hard to grasp entity. The closest thing we have seems to vary depending on the 
context, just as any other act of acceptance. 
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conviction hasn’t been reached), but still doubt his innocence with regard to continuing 
to live in a town where this potentially dangerous man lives. Her doubt might therefore 
prompt her to move home. To take a less directly practically-orientated (and dramatic) 
decision, we have seen in the previous section that most acts of assertion may count as 
context-dependent acceptances: our juror may doubt guilt (and accept innocence) in 
court, but she may doubt innocence with regard to what to tell others (family, friends, 
or maybe journalists — supposing this was allowed to jurors). But if there really is no 
decision of any sort at stake, if our juror is simply unsure, with no further consequence, 
it would not make sense to say that she ‘doubts’: she rather is in a passive state of belief 
suspension, where doubt no longer arises, because no specific question is asked. 
If, however, she is not sure but is not content with such a state, and wants to know more 
about the case, just for the sake of it, then she may arguably say that she “still doubts”. 
But how could the reasonableness of such doubt be assessed? In fact, since no empirical 
hypothesis is ever 100% sure, how could such a ‘purely theoretical’ doubt be considered 
unreasonable at all? If she considers that she needs to know more to be able to 
peacefully stop doubting, how could one object to her that this is unreasonable? Maybe 
after all are we not even entitled to qualify of ‘unreasonable’ someone who would doubt 
that the Earth is round from a purely theoretical point of view (if no practical 
consequence follows)? Similarly, if no practically detrimental decision follows, doubts 
about the rotundity of the Earth, or about Al-Qaeda’s being responsible for the 9/11 plot 
should not be called unreasonable? 
First of all, one must note that the frontier between purely theoretical and practically 
orientated inquiry (or doubt) is not clear cut, and that there rather seems to be a 
continuum from the most practical to the most theoretical. Although moving house is 
clearly practical, and continuing the inquiry for the sake of it seems purely theoretical, 
what about, for instance, judging others (their reliability, expertise, the quality of their 
information sources, etc.) based on their opinion about a certain question? Doubting a 
claim implies doubting the sources thereof, and the credibility of people who endorse 
it. Such a ‘chain reaction’ might be practically consequential: if you start doubting a 
given claim that is unanimously endorsed by the scientific community, you may finally 
end up doubting the reliability of vaccination, for instance. And in fact, as highlighted in 
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the introduction, many conspiracy theorists or ‘merchants of doubt’ primarily appeal to 
‘critical thinking’ and ‘open-mindedness’, which are supposedly harmless (at worse, and, 
most often, beneficial). 
However, even though one abstracts from any practical consequences that may follow 
from doubting a claim, it seems that ‘purely theoretical’ doubt could possibly be 
considered unreasonable in some other sense(s), which have to do with allocation of 
cognitive resources. Consider our juror, still doubting the defendant’s innocence. What 
would such doubt imply? From just keeping her mind open to the hypothesis of guilt, 
thinking of it and reconsidering evidence to getting passionate about it, leading her own 
inquiry by systematically exploring several scenarios of what happened, and even trying 
to gather more evidence, she might invest more or less time and energy in this issue.41 
Independent of the practical consequences of such an investment (if really passionate 
with the issue, she might neglect her usual business, family, or even do so at the expense 
of her rest and health, etc.), whether the purely cognitive costs are worth spending 
depends on several parameters, including the importance she gives to this issue 
relatively to others, at the expense of which she allocates her cognitive resources to it, 
but also the chances she has to actually find new information that may make a 
significant difference.42 The question of the best allocation of cognitive resources  
therefore also includes an estimation of the subject’s own competences in comparison 
with others’: on some subjects, one should rather defer to others43 (more experts on 
the matter), both because they are more likely to find and adequately process relevant 
information, but also because one’s own cognitive energy would be better allocated 
elsewhere.44 
                                                     
41 As one anonymous reviewer notes, there should be a way to develop our account of doubt as essentially 
decision-relative in a way that makes room for a general disposition to doubt — by contrast with active 
doubting — as valuable, insofar as it warrants openness to potential alternative hypotheses. 
42 This argument is different from Huneman’s (2015), who suggests that adopting some conspiracy 
theories might result very costly from an epistemic point of view, because of the radical revision of one’s 
web of belief it implies. This approach rather applies to the adoption of fanciful theories than for doubt. 
Indeed, doubting a theory does not imply accepting another one. Hence, doubting well entrenched 
theories does not necessarily lead to incoherence. At any rate, our argument is not incompatible with 
Huneman’s. 
43 See Hardwig 1985. 
44 One could even add some global coherence constraints on thresholds, whereby one should doubt any 
claim that is less confirmed than a given claim I doubt. However, such constraints seem to conflict with 
others, having to do with social norms. For instance, imagine a person who has no a priori reason to 
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Those considerations drawn from consideration of our fictional juror have obvious 
consequences for scientific questions of societal importance. Considering them shows 
that other grounds for judgements of (un)reasonableness might be found in some value 
judgements. Optimization of collective inquiry by means of division of cognitive labor 
could conflict with thirst for individual knowledge. On a different level, a certain 
conception of epistemic responsibility could prompt someone to escape from a road 
often taken by conspiracy theorists and “merchants of doubt”, likely to pulling one away 
from one’s own landmarks and finally to leading one to give up the very epistemic values 
that initially made one doubt. Conversely, a certain conception of intellectual courage 
and honesty could prompt one to take it.45 Clearly, depending on all those parameters, 
judgements of the (un)reasonableness of doubt must vary from individual to individual: 
not only do different people not have the same evidential basis and competences, but 
they do not necessarily share the same values. 
The issue of the allocation of cognitive resources appears in a particularly salient way in 
the case of ‘pure’ theoretical doubts such as our ex-juror’s. Indeed, even if one assumes 
that there might be some kind of confirmation threshold beyond which she would be 
satisfied and stop doubting, one can also think of theoretical inquiry as potentially never 
ending: unlike other cases where decision has to be made at some point for some 
practical reasons, there would be no reason to settle the issue beside problems of 
cognitive resources limitation. However, all the aspects of the (un)reasonableness of 
doubt highlighted in this section are not essentially different depending on whether 
there is something practical at stake or not. Indeed, even in inquiries that are, in fine, 
highly consequential, search strategies in the space of doubt are certainly constrained 
                                                     
believe that she has a certain disease that is relatively rare (let’s say a 1 on 3 000 incidence in global 
population). If that person decides to take the diagnostic test that no one takes unless one has some 
reason to suspect that one is ill, one would think this person is unreasonable (she unreasonably doubts 
that she is healthy to this respect and search more evidence). Now imagine another person who is 
considered at risk for an extremely rare disease: the incidence in general population is 1 on 1 000 000, 
but that person has 1 on 3 000 chance to suffer from this disease. She will be considered totally reasonable 
to take some test to know whether she has this disease (even though we assume same costs for test, and 
same gravity of disease, and equal opportunity to cure it).   
45 Alice Dreger’s inquiries, as she tells them in Galileo’s middle finger (2015) embody this kind of 
intellectual (and more general) courage. This leads her to deep reflections on whether any hot question 
is worth debating, raising both the question of whether one should address any question whatever one 
may find (even if that might somehow be detrimental for social justice) but also because one may initially 
think that there is no chance to find anything on such a route. 
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by time and resources (of different kinds) limitation. But this does not seem essentially 
different from purely theoretical inquiry as paradigmatically exemplified by the 
character of Sherlock Holmes, even a highly consequential and practically orientated 
quest such as criminal inquiry might resemble in many ways a purely theoretical one, 
where one may try several strategies, among others exploring some initially implausible 
route. 
Where are we now? Despite their complexity and multidimensionality, the various 
parameters entering the evaluation of the (un)reasonableness of doubt that we have 
presented in this section seem all to be capturable in terms of allocation of resources. 
Allocation of resources itself should be describable in terms of costs and benefits. It must 
already be obvious that factoring in those costs and benefits in estimating whether the 
threshold for acceptance (hence the threshold beyond which one should just stop 
doubting) has been met is far from trivial. Given the variety of possible routes in the 
space of doubt, and the multidimensionality of the parameters entering the costs and 
benefits calculation, one has reasons to suspect the threshold view is too coarse a 
simplification to account for reasonable doubt. Let us now come back to the threshold 
view in the light of the above analysis. 
 
 
5. Reasonable doubt as a probabilistic threshold: some limits 
 
Let us briefly take stock of where we are. In section 1, we have highlighted two aspects 
of the DT account of reasonable doubt, namely the idea of a probabilistic threshold (C1) 
and the assumption of graded beliefs as only epistemic attitudes (C2). Deepening our 
intuitions regarding reasonable doubt, we haven’t truly challenged C2, but we have 
highlighted the complexity and multidimensionality of the (un)reasonableness of doubt, 
of which the DT framework as such does not say anything. Although all these aspects 
can in the end be described in terms of utilities, their articulation with the threshold 
view needs to be explored. To do so, we will highlight two problems that make the idea 
of a probabilistic threshold too narrow to account for the notion of reasonable doubt. 
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Those two problems, although distinct, both have to do with how we deal with our 
ignorance, and especially our ignorance of the extent of what we ignore. 
As mentioned in section 1, not accepting H might lead, depending on the situation, to 
accepting non-H (in which case doubt no longer arises), or instead to seeking more 
information before accepting or rejecting H. However, what non-H is needs to be 
clarified, and a distinction needs to be drawn.  In some situations, non-H needs to be 
made specific (a specific alternative hypothesis has to be proposed, and accepted in 
order to reject H). In others, one needs not necessarily make non-H specific to reject H. 
We will alternatively consider problems arising with the two types of cases. 
 
5.1 ‘Unpacking’ non-H 
 
As mentioned earlier, jurors have no choice, if they do not accept H, but to accept non-
H. However, the DT framework does not say much about what non-H may be, beyond 
the negation of H. Given what we have seen in the previous sections, as to the various 
possible routes in the space of doubt, we however suspect that an account of reasonable 
doubt in terms of a probabilistic threshold is not enough if it does not take into account 
the importance of non-H in the evaluation of whether the confirmation threshold for H 
has been met.46 In other words, there might be reasons to doubt H that are not well 
explicated by merely describing them as reasons not to accept H (as absence of sufficient 
reasons to accept it). 
Consider a juror again. In deciding what verdict to bring, she is instructed to only use the 
evidence that is presented in court (hence the question of whether to gather more 
evidence does not arise). The evidence she is supposed to rely on to calculate the 
posterior probability of guilt may vary in quantity as well as in quality. As a result, this 
probability is more or less robust and resilient to potentially additional evidence. 
Suppose that, on the basis of the evidence she was presented with, a juror evaluates the 
probability of guilt to a very high degree — at any rate sufficient to meet the reasonable 
                                                     
46 This issue is related to another one, which we will not address here, about whether statistical evidence 
is enough to convict — such as the so-called “gate-crasher paradox” (Cohen 1981). 
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doubt threshold. She can however suspect that the inquiry wasn’t carried out properly. 
This does not merely mean that some pieces of evidence might have been fabricated, 
or that some witnesses may be lying. Part of the jurors’ task is actually to evaluate 
witnesses’ reliability and evidence overall credibility. Let us thus ignore that aspect, and 
suppose that all the evidence presented in court is credible and relevant (or that relative 
credibility has already been factored in). It remains possible that, among the elements 
that were not presented, some would have been relevant — at least from our juror’s 
point of view47. More generally, inquiry is doomed to be partial. In some cases, a juror 
may suspect that other items could have been collected, which might counterbalance 
the evidence actually presented in court. In this case, she may consider that the 
confirmation degree of the hypothesis based on the available evidence, however high, 
might get significantly lower were further pieces brought. In other terms, she may be 
more or less confident in her own probabilistic judgement. It seems clear that this must 
be taken into account when assessing whether the reasonable doubt threshold has been 
met. Hence, whether it is reasonable to doubt a hypothesis seems to depend on second 
order, rather than on first order factors only.48 
Although the DT framework is certainly able to integrate such second order factors, this 
may not be as trivial a task as it may seem. To understand why, let us draw a distinction 
between two types of missing evidence. On the one hand, there is evidence which one 
knows is missing; for instance, if the inquiry shows that a car is implied in a crime 
because there are tire tracks indicating it, but has no clue as to what the brand of the 
car is. That is information that would be relevant for the inquiry (and in fine for 
evaluating the guilt of a particular person), but which could not be gathered for some 
reason. Clearly, a good Bayesian reasoner should integrate in her final degree of belief 
her own assessment of the quality of the evidential basis (hence her assessment of how 
much relevant evidence is missing). On the other hand, there is all the evidence that one 
does not have because it would constitute evidence for hypotheses inquirers haven’t 
explored, considered, or even formulated — but which might be relevant as alternative 
                                                     
47 See Schum 1994 on the irreducible subjectivity of the evaluation of the relevance of evidence. 
48 As emphasized by Stephen John in personal communication, this is well exemplified by debates over 
climate modelling: one can have some degree of belief in some claim generated by a model, but also have 
reasons to worry the model itself is partial. 
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hypotheses to H — in other words, as specific non-Hs. As soon as there is a particular 
suspect, criminal inquirers generally focus on the collection of evidence that is relevant 
for the evaluation of the suspect’s guilt (be it incriminating or exculpatory evidence); 
even though they may leave some other options open, they cannot gather all the 
evidence that might possibly be relevant for entirely unconsidered scenarios. Once the 
case is brought to trial, the guilt hypothesis — let us call it H — is made specific; it gets 
fleshed out as a more or less detailed scenario (minimally, in the case of a murder, “the 
defendant murdered the victim”). On the other hand, the innocence hypothesis —non-
H — often remains unspecified. Admittedly, the defence can propose an exculpatory 
scenario — hence a specific non-H1 (e.g. by advocating the thesis of an accident), but 
that does not exhaust all scenarios satisfying non-H. What would happen to one’s degree 
of belief in H if some new evidence relevant for a particular non-H were brought is a 
difficult question, but one obviously important for any account of reasonable doubt as 
a probabilistic threshold.49 How can one account for whether the reasonable threshold 
has been met based on reasons to accept H, if one does not consider potential reasons 
to accept specific non-Hs — hence reasons to doubt H that do not reduce to reasons to 
reject it? Clearly, all the potential routes that a free inquirer as the tireless former juror 
imagined in the previous section could take (which the juror on duty cannot), and what 
they might lead to, should play a role in estimating whether the reasonable doubt 
threshold has been met. 
 
3.2 Infinite regress of ignorance and doubt 
The juror’s situation makes the problem exposed in the previous subsection particularly 
salient and clear. Indeed, jurors are not in charge of the collection of evidence; 
moreover, among the evidence gathered in the course of the inquiry, only the pieces 
that are judged admissible are presented to the court, and jurors are explicitly instructed 
not to take any other piece of information they may possess into account. However long 
the deliberation may be, at the end of the day, the juror must conclude on the exclusive 
basis of the elements presented in court; she cannot pursue the inquiry by herself — or 
                                                     
49 This is object of Hahn and Hartmann, in progress. 
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even ask for more elements to be brought to the court. Finally, even though one does 
need to come up with a specific non-H to reject H, there must be a specific non-H 
explaining what actually happened if H is not true. 
However, in many other situations, settling the issue does not necessarily amount to 
finally accepting a specific hypothesis (either H or a specific non-H). This may give rise to 
another kind of problem, which also makes the idea of a probabilistic threshold for 
reasonable doubt too simplistic. 
Let us call H the hypothesis that a patient suffers from disease D, which only medication 
M may cure. The decision at stake is whether to take M or not: in this situation, accepting 
H implies taking M. Here, not accepting H at time t does not necessarily imply definitively 
accepting non-H; rather, one can consider that one does not know enough yet to accept 
H, and search for more information before settling the issue. Moreover, unlike in the 
juror’s situation, the question of specific non-Hs is not as pressing: the urgent question 
is whether one should take some medication to cure D (hence whether one actually 
suffers from D or not), but not necessarily what the right explanation is. There might 
indeed be nothing special to explain: one may be in a risk group for some disease, 
without one’s having any particular symptom that needs to be explained otherwise if it 
turns out that one does not suffers from that disease. In other words, if H is false, that 
might not necessarily imply that non-H needs to be specified; it might be sufficient to 
reject H.50 
On current knowledge, the confirmation threshold of H (for accepting it) depends on 
several parameters, among which the seriousness of the consequences of D for the 
patient, the side-effects of M, and its chances of success, but also the risks and potential 
benefits of delaying the decision. What could be the potential benefits of delaying the  
decision — hence doubting H without accepting non-H and settling the issue? First of 
all, one may of course gather more information relevant to the degree of confirmation 
of H by undergoing further analyses. Second, one’s doctor may also make some progress 
in her knowledge of D (if D is a rare disease on which little research has been done, and 
                                                     
50 This is far from a rare situation. Most application of the precaution principle consists in acting as if H 
was the case, without necessarily searching an explanation for a specific phenomenon. 
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is still rather confidential, it is possible that a few additional studies, or a more thorough 
inquiry, suffice to elaborate other treatments, or to uncover serious side-effects of M). 
As mentioned in the previous section, one crucial question is whether we have any 
chance to change the confirmation degree in a significant way. But, in deciding whether 
to doubt H or not must enter considerations about one’s chances to find new 
information that might modify not only the confirmation degree of H, but also the 
threshold for accepting H itself; indeed, information about the evidence regarding H is 
not always independent from evidence about the potential consequences of accepting 
H. All these potentialities of changing one’s current state of knowledge should be 
probabilistically assessed, and they are so on the basis of one’s current state of 
knowledge. Hence infinite regression threatens. In other words, delaying opens up a 
space of potentiality that make the problem of potentially infinite complexity. 
Hence, the threshold view is simplistic for another reason: the question is not only how 
much H is confirmed and how robust this degree is, but also how robust the setting of 
the threshold is. Against the risk of delaying, one must therefore evaluate one’s own 
ignorance, not only of what we know, but also of what we ignore. 
The two problems addressed in this last section show that the issue of reasonable doubt 
has to do with how we deal with our ignorance, and how we factor it in in our 
calculation. Without going any further, let us emphasise how focusing on doubt leads to 




We hope to have shown that a doubt-centred approach reveals the richness of the 
epistemic attitudes and actions (including purely mental actions such as reasoning 
processes) at stake in any decision-making, which are often obscured by belief-centred 
approaches. Rather than what one believes, the question of reasonable doubt concerns 
what one ignores, and how one manages one’s own ignorance. The latter being 
unbounded, and undertermined, the problem is multidimensional, and of a virtually 
infinite complexity. The way each one decides to allocate one’s resources (both 
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cognitive and other) depends on a complex web of epistemic attitudes and values. The 
intuition underlying the DT picture, according to which the limit of reasonable doubt 
depends, in fine, on each one’s preferences, may be right. But the ideas of a probabilistic 
threshold set by the context and of graded beliefs appeal for some enrichment by a 
deepened analysis of possible mental states and actions, which we hope to have 
sketched here. In doing so, we hope to have proposed a plausible integrated account of 
what makes it possible to state that the stubborn juror’s scepticism is reasonable, while 
the 9/11 official’s theory denier’s isn’t, by at the same time questioning the idea of a 
clear-cut distinction between theoretical, and practical aspects of doubt.  
Finally, let us mention that no analysis of reasonable doubt could be complete without 
integrating a dimension essential to any epistemic decision, which we had to ignore 
here, namely its collective aspects. Like a juror in a jury, what (one believes) others 
believe plays a determining role in one’s own epistemic decisions — which increases 
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